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Abstract: Military assistance is a perennial feature of international relations. Such programmes 
typically aim to improve the effectiveness of local partners, exporting the donor’s way of war through 
the provision of training and equipment. By remaking indigenous armies in their own image, donors 
likewise hope to mitigate the profound agency costs associated with the transfer of military capability. 
But, while technical and organisational transformations can provide notable battlefield advantages, 
the philosophies underlying such innovations are not so easily propagated. Instead, new tactics, 
structures and technologies typically intersect with pre-existing local schemata of war, producing 
novel if sometimes dysfunctional hybrid praxes. According to principal-agent theory, the application 
of greater conditionality in the provision of military assistance should improve the fidelity of military 
diffusion, aligning agents’ divergent interests with their principals’ goals. In practice, however, 
principal-agent exchanges rarely exist in isolation. Examining the modernisation of nineteenth-century 
Japan as a case study in military diffusion, this paper argues that competition between rival patrons 
allows recipient states to play would-be principals off against each other, bypassing conditionality by 
replicating a marketplace for military assistance. In so doing, however, agents trade functionality for 
sovereignty in their military diffusion. 
 




Changes in military technology and praxis can confer significant battlefield advantages, creating 
important implications for national survival and international politics alike. Indeed, practices like 
military assistance rely on the passage of military capability from one state to another to achieve their 
policy goals. Yet, the diffusion of military capability cannot be taken for granted, even between close 
partners. Arms transfers, for example, have a poor track record for improving recipient military 
capability, while deployed training missions can equally struggle to improve local military proficiency.1 
Moreover, even close NATO allies have occasionally balked at expensive US warfighting paradigms, 
raising concerns that the Western pre-occupation with high-technology warfighting may itself impede 
future efforts to develop partner military capacity. Consequently, understanding how military 
capabilities diffuse from state to state – and why they sometimes don’t – is of considerable interest, 
to scholars and policymakers alike.2 
Partial military diffusion has traditionally been explained through variations in external threat, 
national culture, or domestic politics. More recently, principal-agent theory has been advanced to 
explain the particular challenges of military assistance. Here, partial diffusion is understood as the 
product of interest asymmetries between donor and recipient, which disincentivise aspects of 
diffusion even when new capabilities are otherwise actively desired. By extension, principal-agent 
theory implies that policymakers might use incentives and conditionality to structure the interests of 
their allies, thereby improving the fidelity of military assistance. So far, however, principal-agent 
theory has generally only been framed to describe bilateral military relationships between a single 
hegemonic donor at its client.3 Instead, this paper explores the impact of multiple simultaneous 
principal-agent interactions on the conduct of military assistance, using the military modernisation of 
nineteenth-century Japan a case study for theory development. It concludes that rivalry between 
principals can create a marketplace for military assistance, enabling the recipient to bypass 
conditionality by playing donors off against each other. For Meiji Japan, this provided greater control 
over the process of military modernization, but at the expense of fidelity in the diffusion of imported 
military models.  
 
1 Patricia Sullivan, Brock Tessman & Xiaojun Li, ‘US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation’, Foreign Policy 
Analysis, 7:3 (2011), pp. 275–94; Adam Grissom, ‘Shoulder-to-Shoulder Fighting Different Wars: NATO Advisors 
and Military Adaptation in the Afghan National Army, 2001-2011’, in Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga & James 
Russell (eds.), Military Adaptation in Afghanistan (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2013), pp. 263-87. 
2 Terry Terriff, Frans Osinga & Theo Farrell (eds.), A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European 
Military Change (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2010); David Galbreath, ‘Moving the Techno-Science Gap in Security 
Force Assistance’, Defence Studies, 19:1 (2019), pp. 49-61. 
3 Stephen Biddle, ‘Building Security Forces & Stabilizing Nations: The Problem of Agency’, Daedalus, 146:4 
(2017), pp. 126-138; Stephen Biddle, Julia Macdonald & Ryan Baker, ‘Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The 
Military Effectiveness of Security Force Assistance’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 41:1-2 (2018), pp 89-142. 
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Explaining Partial Diffusion during Military Assistance 
In essence, military diffusion is about the transfer of military technology, tactics and organisational 
forms from one place to another. Diffusion therefore implies a demonstrable path of causality 
between originator and subsequent implementation in a new context. Although the diffusion of 
military technology has attracted particular attention, material artefacts rarely exist in a social 
vacuum, and so the successful diffusion of military technology is typically accompanied by the ideas 
and knowledge that animates its effective application.4 Importantly, disparities in either technology 
or praxis can confer dramatic, if fleeting, advantages in war.5 Consequently, neorealism expects states 
to rapidly import new military practices in order to survive. According to Waltz, ‘states imitate the 
military innovations contrived by the country of greatest capability and ingenuity…so the weapons of 
the major contenders, and even their strategies, begin to look much the same’.6 Yet, in reality, 
technology and praxis often diffuse slowly and separately, producing novel ‘hybrids and creole 
artefacts’ in what Horowitz describes as a process of ‘mutation’.7 Moreover, while these partial or 
hybrid military forms can sometimes be more potent in their local context than the original model, 
they often prove to be significantly less capable.8 
Traditionally, this apparent contradiction has been explained through system-level factors 
that moderate the imperative for change. Alliances and external balancing can provide alternatives to 
profound military change, while offensive and defensive technologies and doctrines may appeal to 
states differently, depending on the peculiarities of local geography.9 Equally, where diffusion is 
undertaken for reasons other than functional performance, the propensity for selective, partial or 
dysfunctional importation may increase. Foreign military models are sometimes imposed through 
third-party pressure, as with the Warsaw Pact armies that practiced ‘Potemkin drills in Potemkin skills’ 
for Moscow’s benefit.10 Similarly, a lack of clarity over military best practice can lead states to emulate 
 
4 Leslie Eliason & Emily Goldman, ‘Introduction: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives on Innovation and 
Diffusion’, in Emily Goldman & Leslie Eliason (eds.), The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas (Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 2003), pp. 11-14. 
5 Emily Goldman & Richard Andres, ‘Systemic Effects of Military Innovation and Diffusion’, Security Studies, 8:4 
(1999), pp. 79-125. 
6 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 127.  
7 David Pretel & Lino Camprubí, ‘Technological Encounters: Locating Experts in the History of Globalisation’, in 
David Pretel & Lino Camprubí (eds.), Technology and Globalisation: Networks of Experts in World History 
(Basingstoke/Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave, 2018), p. 8; Michael Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: 
Causes and Consequences for International Politics (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2010), p. 19. 
8 Michael Eisenstadt & Kenneth Pollack, ‘Armies of Snow and Armies of Sand: The Impact of Soviet Military 
Doctrine on Arab Militaries’, in Goldman & Eliason, Diffusion of Military Technology, pp. 63-92. 
9 Geoffrey Herrera & Thomas Mahnken, ‘Military Diffusion in Nineteenth-Century Europe: The Napoleonic and 
Prussian Military Systems’, in ibid., pp. 205-42. 
10 Christopher Jones, ‘Reflections on Mirror Images: Politics and Technology in the Arsenals of the Warsaw 
Pact’, in ibid., p. 119. 
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leading countries as a form of hedging, while normative perceptions can encourage diffusion for the 
legitimacy (rather than the security) such practices confer.11 However, systemic imperatives are 
typically instrumentalised through national and sub-national processes, focusing attention on the local 
‘blockages to technological assimilation’ that moderate diffusion, or ‘the political economy of 
technology’.12 Goldman, for instance, found that national military cultures can be more or less tolerant 
of external ideas, affecting their receptiveness to foreign military innovations, while the structure of 
domestic civil-military relations can likewise impede the importation of foreign military innovations.13 
Consequently, Horowitz has proposed an ‘adoption-capacity’ model, in which the expected benefits 
of military diffusion are weighed against the expected costs of implementation, providing an 
explanation for both state-level and systemic responses to military change embedded in the practical 
obstacles individual states face in importing particular military models.14 In so doing, these scholars 
draw attention to the importance of implementation mechanisms, as opposed to motives, in 
understanding patterns of military diffusion.  
Practically, though, diffusion occurs through a variety of mechanisms, defined according to 
the level of external involvement the importation of military change. For Horowitz, this range is largely 
subsumed within the broader calculus of the financial and organisational capital required to 
implement military change, yet the nature and degree of foreign involvement can itself affect the 
desirability, feasibility, and quality of diffusion processes. At one end of this spectrum, imitation or 
emulation need not involve any direct foreign assistance, and battlefield learning can sometimes even 
unwittingly enable diffusion between enemies.15 However, diffusion often benefits from external 
assistance to some degree. This may be informal, as with the professional discourse between 
international defence attachés, exchange officers, and technical experts.16 At the other end of the 
spectrum, foreign support may be formal and overt. Weapons sales typically include contracts for 
training and technology transfer, while states may also receive military-to-military aid, known as 
military assistance. This typically takes the form of seconded training missions or contracted advisors, 
 
11 Chris Demchack, ‘Creating the Enemy: Global Diffusion of the Information Technology-Based Military 
Model’, in Goldman & Eliason, Diffusion of Military Technology, pp. 307-47; Theo Farrell, ‘Transnational Norms 
and Military Development: Constructing Ireland's Professional Army’, European Journal of International 
Relations, 7:1 (2001), pp. 63-102. 
12 Pretel & Camprubí, ‘Technological Encounters’, p. 8.  
13 Emily Goldman, ‘Cultural Foundations of Military Diffusion’, Review of International Studies, 32:1 (2006), pp. 
69-91; Burak Kadercan, ‘Strong Armies, Slow Adaptation: Civil-Military Relations and the Diffusion of Military 
Power’, International Security, 38:3 (2014), p.117-152. 
14 Horowitz, Diffusion of Military Power. 
15 Barry Posen, ‘Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power’, International Security, 18:2 (1993), pp. 80-
124; Theo Farrell, ‘Military Adaptation and Organisational Convergence in War: Insurgents and International 
Forces in Afghanistan’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Online First (2020), pp. 1-24. 
16 Tarak Barkawi, ‘“Defence Diplomacy” in North-South Relations’, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of 
Global Policy Analysis, 66:3 (2011), pp. 597-612. 
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though foreign military officers sometimes assume command of local forces in order to better direct 
change.17 In principle, military assistance can be expected to produce the greatest fidelity in military 
diffusion, inasmuch as it provides direct access to the expertise (and often also equipment) that less 
formal mechanisms struggle to acquire. Certainly, attempts at emulation are often implicitly limited 
by the established organisational priorities and cultural perceptions that shape institutional 
understandings of foreign military change, as Mahnken has shown.18 Yet, in practice, military 
assistance often struggles to overcome conflicting political, cultural or bureaucratic agendas, even in 
the face of clear imperatives – and despite active recipient engagement.19 
 Recently, principal-agent theory has been advanced as a framework to understand these 
dynamics. According to principal-agent theory, partial change can be understood as the product of a 
divergence of interests between recipient “agent” armies, who seek military assistance to achieve 
particular goals, and foreign “principals”, who provide it to further their own national aims.20 This 
interest asymmetry encourages the agent to “shirk” particular changes desired by the principal, but 
which diverge from their own preferences – something exacerbated by the normative prisms through 
which principals perceive (or misperceive) their own and their agent’s interests.21 In theory, principals 
can use conditionality in the provision of military assistance to mitigate shirking, using punishment 
and reward in carrot and stick fashion to structure the interests of their agent, thereby improving the 
fidelity of military diffusion. During the Korean War, for example, US conditionality successfully 
overcame South Korean objections to military professionalisation, while the application of 
conditionality to US military assistance in Iraq produced an immediate, if modest, reduction in 
shirking.22 Yet, even proponents of greater conditionality in military assistance have been highly 
circumspect about its likely impact. Biddle, for example, has argued that military assistance will 
 
17 Donald Stoker (ed.), Military Advising and Assistance: From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815-2007 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2008). 
18 Thomas Mahnken, ‘Uncovering Foreign Military Innovation’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 22:4 (1999), pp. 26-
54; Thomas Mahnken, Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918-1941 
(Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2002). See also, George Hofmann, ‘The Tactical and Strategic Use of Attaché Intelligence: 
The Spanish Civil War and the US Army’s Misguided Quest for a Modern Tank Doctrine’, Journal of Military 
History, 62:2 (1998), pp. 101–33; Olivier Schmitt, ‘French Military Adaptation in the Afghan War: Looking 
Inward or Outward?’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 40:4 (2017), pp. 577-99. 
19 Joâo Resende‐Santos, ‘Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems: Military Organization and Technology 
in South America, 1870–1930’, Security Studies, 5:3 (1996), pp. 193-260; Ryan Grauer, ‘Moderating Diffusion: 
Military Bureaucratic Politics and the Implementation of German Doctrine in South America, 1885–1914’, 
World Politics, 67:2 (2015), pp. 268-312. 
20 Eli Berman & David Lake (eds.), Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence through Local Agents (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 
2019); Biddle, ‘Problem of Agency’, pp. 126-138. 
21 Eric Rittinger, ‘Arming the Other: American Small Wars, Local Proxies, and the Social Construction of the 
Principal-Agent Problem’, International Studies Quarterly, 61:2 (2017), pp. 396–409. 
22 Julia Macdonald, ‘South Korea, 1950-53: Exogenous Realignment of Preferences’, in Berman & Lake (eds.), 
Proxy Wars, pp. 28-52; David Lake, ‘Iraq, 2003-11: Principal Failure’, in ibid., pp. 238-63. 
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generally improve recipient capabilities somewhat, if only because more training is better than less. 
Nevertheless, interest asymmetry is still held to create ‘a ceiling on real effectiveness’, in part because 
it concomitantly reduces principal’s access to reliable information on agent behaviour necessary for 
enforcing conditionality.23  
Typically, though, principal-agent theory has been used to describe the bilateral relationships 
between one military patron and their local partner, often from the perspective of the donor nation. 
Yet, in practice, principal-agent interactions in rarely exist in isolation. Just as principals retain the 
option to seek alternative agents, so agents may court multiple patrons – with potentially profound 
implications for the utility of conditionality during military assistance. With other types of 
international aid, recipient states can use these pluralistic relationships to bypass principals’ 
conditionality, despite an enduring dependence on foreign help.24 Indeed, US conditionality in military 
assistance to Iraq appears to have been implicitly limited by the Maliki regime’s simultaneous ability 
to seek rival sources of military patronage from neighbouring Iran, rendering conditionality a “least-
bad” policy option rather than a proverbial silver bullet.25 Yet, little concerted attention has so far 
been paid to these dynamics in the literature on military assistance. How, then, do these parallel 
relationships affect the principal-agent politics of military assistance? And what impact do they have 
on the quality of military diffusion? 
Conceptualising Principals and Agents in Military Assistance 
In a principal-agent relationship, the principal contracts an agent to conduct activity on their behalf, 
in furtherance of a desired goal. Principals typically employ agents because they lack the appetite or 
attributes necessary to directly achieve the aim themselves. However, this compact need not be 
formal, and as Berman et al note, agents frequently do not recognise themselves as such. Instead, 
principal-agent relationships are often tacit, defined by the overall pattern of power relations between 
each state, and the provision of rewards in exchange for desired activity.26 Consequently, the function 
of military assistance in principal-agent interactions will vary, depending on each party’s goals and 
interests. When military diffusion is actively desired by the client, assistance may form the currency 
of principal-agent interactions, representing part of the reward offered by the principal. When the 
principal desires the suppression of some (likely shared) threat, recipient military change may 
 
23 Biddle, Macdonald & Baker, ‘Small Footprint, Small Payoff’, pp. 128-31. 
24 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Alastair Smith, ‘Competition and Collaboration in Aid-for-Policy Deals’, 
International Studies Quarterly, 60:3 (2016), pp. 413-426. 
25 Stephen Biddle, ‘Evaluating U.S. Options for Iraq’, Statement to the US House of Representatives Committee 
on Armed Services, 29 July 2014. 
26 Eli Berman, David Lake, Gerard Padró i Miquel & Pierre Yared, ‘Introduction: Principals, Agents, and Indirect 
Foreign Policies’, in Berman & Lake (eds.), Proxy Wars, pp. 1-27. 
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simultaneously form part of the activity expected of the agent, insofar as it facilitates the achievement 
of the principal’s goal. In some cases, military diffusion may actually represent the substance of a 
principal’s goal, perhaps in order to deter or constrain a third-party.  
Typically, though, the aims of the agent will diverge somewhat from those of the principal, 
while the act of delegation invariably means that the principal will lack complete oversight of the 
agent’s behaviour. Hence, neither party can be entirely certain of the other’s commitment or 
intentions. This information asymmetry creates powerful incentives for the agent to “foot-drag”, 
delaying or shirking activity to secure (more) reward from the principal, even when their goals closely 
align. Moreover, the more the interest asymmetry, the more the agent will benefit from diverting or 
misappropriating the principal’s resources in furtherance of their own divergent aims, known as 
agency loss.27 The Afghan National Army, for example, readily accepted US training and equipment, 
but actively avoided politically unpalatable defence reforms, preferring instead to rely on deployed 
US troops to bail them out.28 In principle, the best way to reduce agency loss is to select agents whose 
goals closely match the principal’s own, but this is not always possible in practice. Principals can 
mitigate agency loss through close supervision of the agent, but this reduces the cost effectiveness of 
delegation, and risks sucking the principal into the activity itself. Instead, conditionality provides a 
means to manage interest asymmetry, by using contingent rewards and penalties ‘to manipulate 
allies’ incentive structures in ways that encourage them to work and not shirk’ – often by coercively 
reducing or withholding support.29 
 To be effective, conditionality relies on a significant power differential between principal and 
agent. In Berman et al’s framework, principals must by definition possess the ability to apply reward 
and punishment to their agent, replace them altogether, or forsake the goal entirely. Hence, in this 
understanding, the US could not use principal-agent incentives against a state of equal standing, like 
the Soviet Union, or a state possessing reciprocal leverage, as with Pakistan’s recent custodianship of 
supply lines into Afghanistan.30 Indeed, the recipient state’s relative dependence on their patron is 
seen as a defining feature of principal-agent relationships, and is presumed to limit the recipient’s 
strategic options while facilitating those of the patron. As Shapiro explained, whereas ‘principals are 
risk neutral (they have diversified…), agents are risk averse, because they have placed all their eggs in 
this one basket’.31 This is what Berman and Lake call ‘subordination: the requirement that the principal 
 
27 Biddle, ‘Problem of Agency’, pp. 127-8. 
28 Grissom, ‘Fighting Different Wars’, pp. 263-87. 
29 Biddle, Macdonald & Baker, ‘Small Footprint, Small Payoff’, p. 128. 
30 Berman et al, ‘Introduction’, pp. 11-23. 
31 Susan Shapiro, ‘Agency Theory’, Annual Review of Sociology, 31 (2005), p. 265. 
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be able to influence the proxy more than the proxy can influence the principal’, such that ‘the only 
way the proxy can affect the principal is by choosing effort or shirking’.32  
Yet, in reality, an agent is rarely confined only to working or shirking. Historically, some states 
have attempted to use mercenaries alongside formal military assistance as means to hedge against 
the influence of would-be principals, while those that come to depend on a single foreign patron for 
security risk outsourcing survival to the whims of another. 33 Importantly, recourse to multiple sources 
of military assistance might allow an agent to bypass conditionality, by playing rival principals off 
against each other. In economics, where agents frequently engage in multiple simultaneous principal-
agent relationships, this is known as a ‘common agency’ problem.34 Logically, though, this possibility 
depends on a series of conditions being met. Firstly, the agent must have access to more than one 
source of military assistance. States with limited options must take what help they can, and accept the 
strings that come with it. Secondly, the assistance in question must be essentially fungible between 
suppliers. Significant disparities in the quality, quantity, or sincerity of assistance available are unlikely 
to provide the agent with credible leverage against the dominant supplier – especially if the inferior 
offer does not meet that agent’s needs. Thirdly, and critically, these principals must prefer to compete 
against each other rather than cooperate for shared control. In other contexts, this is known as a 
principal-principal conflict.35 Here, the agent’s ability to play rival principals off against each other will 
be assisted by variation in the conditionality each principal applies to its assistance, or else by 
uncertainty over the scope and conditions of a rival offer. 
When principals share common goals, co-ordination provides clear benefits, effectively 
transforming multiple principals into a single actor.36 This should increase the utility of conditionality, 
though at the risk of potential free-riding among principals. Equally, co-operation may be beneficial 
even when principals’ goals somewhat diverge. This is especially likely when a lesser principal lacks 
the resources or will to compete with more hegemonic patrons. Here, bandwagoning might provide 
the best route to a minimal level of goal accomplishment. Conversely, when states have similar 
abilities to coerce and reward an agent, but possess mutually exclusive or zero-sum goals, competition 
 
32 Eli Berman & David Lake, ‘Conclusion’, in Berman & Lake (eds.), Proxy Wars, p. 297. 
33 John Dunn, ‘Missions or Mercenaries? European Military Advisors in Mehmed Ali’s Egypt, 1815-1848’, in 
Stoker (ed.), Military Advising and Assistance, pp. 11-25; Donald Stoker, ‘Buying Influence, Selling Arms, 
Undermining a Friend: The French Naval Mission to Poland and the Development of the Polish Navy, 1923-
1932’, in ibid., pp. 42-60. 
34 B. Bernheim & Michael Whinston, ‘Common Agency’, Econometrica, 54:4 (1986), pp. 923-942.  
35 Michael Young, Mike Peng, David Ahlstrom, Garry Bruton & Yi Jiang, ‘Corporate Governance in Emerging 
Economies: A Review of the Principal–Principal Perspective’, Journal of Management Studies, 45:1 (2008), pp. 
196-220. 
36 Bernheim & Whinston, ‘Common Agency’, p. 924. 
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may appear the best option.37 In Iraq, for example, Biddle has argued that US conditionality would 
have been more effective had it been able to coordinate with Iran. Failing that, the US might have 
negated Iranian influence by ensuring its carrots and sticks outstripped Iran’s. Certainly, limited 
assistance combined with unwanted conditionality is a recipe for ‘encouraging would-be partners to 
look elsewhere for assistance’.38 Clearly, though, competition between principals does not 
automatically mean that an agent will be able to exploit this rivalry, and principals may sometimes 
prefer to call the agent’s bluff than concede conditions. This seems especially likely when reducing 
strings would increase one-sided risks for the principal to such a degree that the goal is no longer 
worth pursuing. 
Where these three circumstances prevail, however, a recipient state might play multiple 
principals off against each other to avoid conditionality, but at the price of less coherent diffusion. Not 
only would this allow recipient states to cherry-pick aspects of military diffusion without having to 
import politically unpalatable (but objectively necessary) components, it might also result in a 
composite hybrid of various different practices and techniques, as multiple sources of foreign 
expertise are used to bypass the political obligations attached to each. Such a circumstance would 
account for the practical limitations on conditionality in military assistance, while simultaneously 
explaining how states seek to reconcile imperatives for diffusion with national and sub-national 
preferences and priorities. This article now turns to explore the impact of principal-principal conflict 
in one prominent case of hybrid military diffusion: the military modernisation of nineteenth-century 
Japan. 
Nineteenth-Century Japan as a Case Study in Hybrid Military Diffusion 
The modernisation of nineteenth-century Japan represents one of the most remarkable instances of 
military diffusion in modern history. When Commodore Perry’s “black ships” arrived in 1853, Japan 
had been a closed country for over two centuries. Under the Tokugawa Shogunate, Japan was divided 
among rival clan-based domains, or han, ruled by the samurai warrior class. The Shogun’s Bakufu 
government presided on behalf of the titular emperor, maintaining a fragile balance of power through 
feudal privileges, draconian punishment, and international seclusion. Perry’s arrival exposed Japan’s 
relative military inferiority, compelling the Bakufu to accept series of unequal Ansei Treaties that 
 
37 In political lobbying, for example, competition between principals can produce something akin to a 
prisoner’s dilemma. See Avinash Dixit, Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, ‘Common Agency and 
Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making’, Journal of Political Economy, 
105:4 (1997), pp. 752-769. 
38 Biddle, ‘Evaluating U.S. Options for Iraq’, pp. 8-9; Stephen Biddle, ‘Policy Implications for the United States’, 
in Berman & Lake (eds.), Proxy Wars, p. 277. 
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created extra-territorial treaty ports, regulated tariffs, and conferred Western citizens with extra-
judicial status.39 It also precipitated a period of rapid military diffusion, in which military assistance 
played a central role. Until its overthrow in 1868, the Bakufu received a succession of Dutch, French, 
and British missions to modernise its army and navy. The Emperor Meiji’s successor government 
likewise employed British and French help to develop its navy, while French and Prussian advisors 
trained its army. Both regimes also purchased weapons and warships from various Western nations, 
alongside diverse forms of less formal assistance.40 By the 1890s, Japan had begun to export 
indigenously-produced weapons to Western states, and went on to defeat Imperial China in the Sino-
Japanese War of 1895. Japan subsequently suppressed the Boxer Rebellion alongside the Western 
powers; a volte face confirmed by Japanese victory over the Russian Empire in 1905.41 Japan finally 
renegotiated the unequal treaties in 1894, leading to the end of the treaty port system in 1899 and 
the return of Japanese tariff autonomy in 1911.42 
Consequently, Meiji Japan is sometimes presented as the archetypal “rational shopper,” 
selectively cherry-picking the most appropriate military technology and organization in a ‘broad, deep, 
and faithful diffusion’ of Western military practice.43 The Meiji military certainly sought to expunge 
Japan’s indigenous martial heritage, adopting European sabres over samurai swords, and importing 
so much leather for Western-style uniforms that one wag suggested a switch to elephant hide.44 In 
Presseisen’s words, Meiji Japan ‘adopted Europe’s military methods and technology without 
question...The reason lay in a technical superiority for which the Japanese found no equivalent in 
Oriental knowledge’.45 Yet, this veneer of coherence belied significant martial hybridity. As Wittner 
notes, the ‘Guards at the Imperial Palace resembled the Zouaves at the Tuileries and marched to 
French light infantry bugle calls, while marines went on parade to the sound of fife and drum in the 
tradition of their British counterparts’.46 Such outward contrasts reflected a deeper amalgam of 
 
39 W. Beasley, ‘The Foreign Threat and the Opening of the Ports’, in Marius B. Jansen, The Cambridge History of 
Japan, Volume 5: The Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1989), pp. 259-307. 
40 Ernst Presseisen, Before Aggression: Europeans prepare the Japanese Army (Tuscon: University of Arizona 
Press, 1965). 
41 Richard Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army”: National Security and the Technological Transformation of 
Japan (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1994), p. 87. 
42 Michael Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy 
(Harvard: Harvard UP, 2006), pp. 194-200. 
43 Emily Goldman, ‘The Spread of Western Military Models to Ottoman Turkey and Meiji Japan’, in Theo Farrell 
& Terry Terriff (eds.) The Sources of Military Change:  Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
2002), pp. 60-1; D. Eleanor Westney, Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western Organizational 
Practices to Meiji Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1987), p. 19. 
44 Edward Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853-1945 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of 
Kansas, 2009), p. 24, pp. 73-4; David Wittner, Technology and the Culture of Progress in Meiji Japan (London: 
Routledge, 2008), p. 103. 
45 Presseisen, Before Aggression, p. 67. 
46 Wittner, Culture of Progress, p. 103. 
11 
 
various Western practices, created as ‘Meiji officials adopted technologies whose functionality did not 
match stated expectations’.47 Indeed, the fledgling army and navy were even unable to agree on a 
standard gauge for screws; the army advocating (continental) metric sizes while the navy favoured the 
(British) imperial system.48 While a degree of local adaptation was accepted, embodied in the slogan 
wakon yōsai or ‘Japanese spirit, Western technology’, Meiji officials nonetheless downplayed this 
hybridity as a transient product of Japanese backwardness.49  As a French legal advisor wrote, ‘there 
is not a word about the special condition of Japan…it is a question, in their opinion, not of knowing 
themselves, but of transforming themselves’.50 One French diplomat likewise observed that, by 1875, 
Japan displayed ‘a hybrid state of things as displeasing to the Japanese as to foreigner himself’.51 
Importantly, Japanese military diffusion took place against a backdrop of significant domestic 
insecurity and foreign coercion. The Bakufu faced a series of internal threats, eventually leading to its 
defeat in the Boshin War, while the victorious Imperial government likewise faced a succession of 
internal revolts and a further civil war in 1877. These pressures were simultaneously exacerbated by 
the Western treaty powers, who jockeyed to secure ever greater trading privileges in Japan. Indeed, 
the Ansei Treaties typify what Robinson and Gallagher have described as the ‘imperialism of free trade’ 
through which ‘informal empire’ was conducted.52 Externally controlled tariffs, for example, imposed 
fixed exchange rates that resulted in capital flight, currency debasement, and 200 percent price rises 
in Edo. Most-favoured nation clauses likewise extended the benefits of one foreign power to all, while 
denying reciprocal rights to Japan.53 Diplomatic historians have emphasised the dualistic character of 
the nineteenth-century international relations, in which European powers justified their imperial 
activities as part of a “civilizing” process, creating a two-tier international system in which all states 
were notionally equal, yet “lesser” (i.e. militarily inferior) non-Western nations were simultaneously 
denied full sovereignty on the basis of their lack of Westernization.54 Moreover, the treaty powers 
repeatedly used or threatened force to assert their interests in Japan, making negotiation Japan’s ‘best 
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weapon to defend themselves from the West’ as an ersatz ‘form of resistance’.55 Japan’s lack of 
indigenous military capability thus rendered it the archetypical agent state. 
As a result, the modernisation of nineteenth-century Japan provides an ideal case study to 
examine the impact of principal-principal rivalry on the fidelity of military diffusion. Successive 
Japanese regimes were faced with a series of potent domestic threats – ultimately leading to the 
downfall of the Shogun – while simultaneously attempting to reclaim national sovereignty from the 
very powers on which they were dependent for military aid. Moreover, Japan not only employed 
multiple sources of foreign military assistance, but the ensuing diffusion displayed exactly the lack of 
fidelity that principal-principal conflict might be expected to produce. In the existing literature, 
however, functional inconsistencies in Japan’s martial modernisation have typically been explained 
through reference to normative, cultural processes. Goldman, for example, has described Japanese 
military modernisation as a ‘quest for legitimacy and acceptance into the community of modern 
nations’, articulating Japan’s cultural receptivity to modernisation in stark contrast to the 
contemporary Ottoman Empire’s comparative cultural resistance and martial ossification.56 Westney, 
meanwhile, observed a path-dependent “contagion effect” in Meiji diffusion, whereby a lack of 
reliable information led Japan to privilege existing partners over unknown but objectively better 
ones.57 Equally, Morris-Suzuki has attributed uneven modernisation to the labyrinthine social 
networks through which Western ideas, technology and knowledge flowed into Japan.58 Collectively, 
these approaches emphasise the importance of culturally contingent socialisation processes in Meiji 
military diffusion. 
However, while these perspectives collectively provide a compelling explanation for the fusion 
of local and imported traditions, they struggle to account for the simultaneous amalgam of different 
Western models in Japanese diffusion. Indeed, arguably, path-dependent social networks and 
contagion effects alone should have led to a smaller number of hegemonic patrons, rather than the 
eclectic mix of military assistance Japan actually received. Moreover, as Horowitz has argued, 
manifestations of domestic culture are often indistinguishable from (or intimately embedded in) 
domestic political discourse. Thus, although the explanatory power of cultural models should not be 
dismissed, the reciprocal interaction between local politics and international agendas may shape the 
options for, and patterns of, martial diffusion as much as cultural receptivity to change per se.59 
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Accordingly, this article now turns to examine an alternate principal-agent politics of military 
assistance in nineteenth-century Japan, first under the Shogun and then during the Meiji Restoration, 
in order to assess the role of conditionality and principal-principal rivalry in the hybrid patterns of 
Japanese military diffusion. 
Military Assistance to the Shogun, 1854-68 
In 1853, Commodore Perry arrived off Edo with a show of force and a demand that Japan open for 
business. Unable to respond militarily, the Bakufu had little choice but to sign a series of one-sided 
treaties granting trading privileges to various Western nations. While the reopening of Japan was thus 
a triumph of gunboat diplomacy, Western interests in the country varied significantly. For the United 
States, Japan primarily represented an economic opportunity, as a base for trade, whaling and coaling. 
It had neither the inclination nor the means to colonise Japan, especially after the outbreak of the US 
Civil War. Britain, in contrast, viewed Japan through the lens of its wider imperial network, and 
primarily sought to prevent other Western powers from using Japan as a platform to threaten British 
commercial footholds in Hong Kong and Siam.60 However, Britain’s mercantile interest in Japan rose 
as its trade expanded; not least because, in the words of one historian, British faith in free trade 
convinced them that if only ‘unrestricted commerce were allowed between all Japanese and the 
outside world, political discontents would evaporate’.61 France pursued a similar mixture of trade, 
power projection and prestige. The Quay d’Orsay was particularly interested in the export of Japanese 
silk-worm eggs to bolster the French silk industry, then decimated by Pébrine disease. Japan also 
offered a potential strategic harbour for the French navy, while Léon Roches, the French Minister in 
Japan in the 1860s, likewise hoped that ‘Japan would be for us what China is for England, a French 
market’.62 The Western powers were thus united in their aim of opening Japan to further trade, but 
rivals in their efforts to secure Japan for their own benefit. 
For Japan, meanwhile, the treaties underscored the need to acquire modern military 
capabilities. As one domain official wrote in 1853, ‘with insufficient equipment of fire-arms we will not 
be able to fight to the best of our abilities in naval engagements, coastal defence, field operations, or 
any other kind of warfare’, and so ‘will be quite unable to resist their machines’.63 Policies like kinken 
shōbu (‘be frugal and love arms’) and fukoku kyōhei (‘strong army, rich nation’) subsequently aimed 
 
60 Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism, p. 30. 
61 Gordon Daniels, ‘The British Role in the Meiji Restoration: A Re-Interpretive Note’, Modern Asian Studies, 2:4 
(1968), p. 293. 
62 Sims, French Policy, p. 53. 
63 Fukushima Shingo, ‘The Building of a National Army’, in Tōbata Seiichi (ed.), The Modernization of Japan 
(Tokyo: Institute of Asian Economic Affairs, 1966), p. 189. 
14 
 
to stave off Western encroachment by importing Western arms and practices.64 However, the treaties 
also sparked a radical populist reaction, as anti-Bakufu as it was xenophobic. As one British diplomat 
observed, the Shogun had ‘fallen into national discredit by assenting to the much-dreaded renewal of 
intercourse with Western people, though indeed this assent was obtained under irresistible 
pressure’.65 Moreover, this sonnō jōi movement (‘revere the emperor, expel the barbarian’) produced 
a series of attacks against foreigners, including consular staff, for which the Bakufu was held 
responsible. Ernest Satow, a British diplomat and translator, described it as ‘a busy time for Colt and 
Adams’ as ‘everyone wore a pistol...and constantly slept with one under his pillow’.66 Hence, Western 
demands for greater access placed the Bakufu in a double-bind. If the either Shogun or individual 
domains resisted, Western powers might use this as a pretext for war. Yet, if domains hostile to the 
Bakufu (like Satsuma and Choshu) were allowed to trade internationally, this might undermine the 
domestic balance of power on which the Shogunate depended.67 Thus, while the British viewed 
domestic stability and unrestricted trade as mutually reinforcing, the Bakufu viewed them as actively 
opposed, and was primarily interested in limiting territorial access.68 
Caught between its own military inferiority and the divergent interests of the Western 
powers, the Bakufu initially sought to manipulate the Ansei Treaties to its own advantage. Extra-
territoriality, for example, was used to confine foreign merchants to small enclaves at the treaty ports. 
Most favoured nation clauses were likewise used to balance one foreign power against another, in 
order to prevent foreign rivalries from spiralling into conquest. As one domain lord, or daimyō, told 
the Bakufu, ‘The thing most to be feared is not the influx of other countries, but the rivalry between 
England and Russia’.69 In neighbouring China, such clauses had contributed to a policy of ‘using 
barbarians to control barbarians’ by preventing any single foreign power gaining dominance.70 
Although these clauses automatically extended concessions granted to one power to the others, by 
extension, any limitation had to be unanimously agreed, enabling the Bakufu to leverage each power’s 
individual interests against the others. In 1861, for example, the Bakufu used a series of sonnō jōi 
attacks to delay to further port openings, first persuading the Americans (after their legation secretary 
was murdered) and then the British (after their compound was attacked), who then convinced the 
remaining treaty powers.71 In a similar fashion, the Bakufu enlisted British help to dislodge Russian 
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warships from the island of Tsushima. By playing on British fears of a Russian threat to China and Siam, 
the Bakufu got the Royal Navy to do what its own forces could not, in a gambit Auslin has described 
as ‘clearly in line with the bakufu’s policy of playing foreign powers off one against another whenever 
feasible’.72 
Simultaneously, the Bakufu attempted to opportunistically exploit multiple sources of foreign 
military expertise, in order to imitate Western military methods with as little direct Western 
involvement as possible. During Japan’s international seclusion, limited trade was permitted via a 
single Dutch concession in the bay of Edo. As Japan’s only existing Western partner, the Shogun 
ordered a warship from the Dutch soon after Perry’s arrival, and subsequently requested Dutch help 
to train Japanese naval officers. In 1855, the Dutch naval mission established Japan’s first naval 
training school, largely in order to maintain their trading relationships. However, the new military 
school that opened that year in Edo saw Japanese instructors teach Western gunnery from translated 
Dutch manuals.73 Simultaneously, the Bakufu assisted Russian sailors to construct a replacement for 
Admiral Putyatin’s flagship, sunk in a tsunami as he negotiated Russia’s trade treaty with Japan, and 
used the knowledge gained to construct ten indigenously-built Japanese warships.74 By 1862, the 
Shogunate had embarked on its own in-house reorganisation of its samurai troops along Dutch lines, 
intended to create a force of 13,000 infantry, cavalry, and artillery.75 
However, Shogunal attempts at military emulation were undermined by parallel diffusion 
among hostile domains, resulting in a growing threat to the Bakufu’s domestic power – and its efforts 
at international balancing.  Chōshū, for example, had begun to raise mixed commoner-samurai 
Kiheitai, or “special units”, equipped with imported muskets, while Saga had reverse-engineered a 
reverberatory furnace to manufacture small arms and artillery.76 Then, in 1862, Satsuma samurai 
murdered the British merchant Charles Richardson, prompting British demands for reparations from 
the Shogun and Satsuma. Despite successful attempts at delay and obfuscation, the Bakufu’s inability 
to make Satsuma pay ultimately resulted in the Royal Navy’s bombardment of Satsuma’s capital, 
Kagoshima.77 Moreover, the Emperor Kōmei issued a proclamation to expel all foreigners in 1863, 
which the Shogun declined to enforce. Indeed, the British made it clear that any attempt to shut down 
trade would be taken as ‘a declaration of war by Japan itself against the whole of the Treaty Powers’, 
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and Britain and France landed troops to defend Yokohama.78 Nonetheless, Chōshū unilaterally began 
to bombard international shipping in the Shimonoseki Straight, resulting in a joint British, French, 
Dutch and American naval campaign to destroy Chōshū’s shore batteries during the summer of 1864.79 
Chōshū radicals also launched a failed coup against the Shogun at the imperial palace, but were 
deposed in a domain power-struggle before any serious fighting with approaching Bakufu troops.80 
The incidents highlighted the Bakufu’s enduring material weaknesses vis-a-vis both the West and its 
own hostile domains, forcing the Shogun to seek greater formal Western military assistance in what 
Jaundrill has described as a ‘major shift in the shogunate’s approach to military science’.81 
From 1864, Shogunal troops adopted British infantry drills in place of Dutch ones, and 
requested formal British military training. In so doing, however, the Bakufu exposed itself yet further 
to Britain’s political demands. At first, the outgoing British Minister refused to sanction formal military 
assistance, instead granting limited access to the British garrison at Yokohama.82 His successor, Sir 
Harry Parkes, demanded a further indemnity to offset the costs of the Shimonoseki campaign. 
Knowing the Shogun couldn’t pay, he then sought to make made deferral of the indemnity conditional 
on further treaty port openings, telling Whitehall in 1866 that the Shogun’s ‘application for a delay in 
the payment of an Indemnity is a lever in my hands’.83 With the Bakufu dragging its feet on both port 
openings and payment, British military assistance remained concomitantly tokenistic. One Japanese 
official described joint training with the Yokohama garrison as little more than being allowed to ‘peep 
at the English soldiers’ drill through the fence’.84 Satow likewise recalled ‘a review and sham fight’ in 
1866, jointly held as Shogunal troops prepared for a further expedition against Chōshū, in which the 
Japanese troops ‘received all the greater praise because they had received no practical instruction. 
Their officers had got it up from books, the difficult passages being explained to them by ours’.85 
Moreover, the Bakufu’s rivals in Satsuma and Chōshū continued to receive significant quantities of 
arms and ammunition via the British merchant Thomas Glover. During two months in 1865 alone, 
Chōshū acquired 1,800 rifles, 3,000 muskets and 6,300 pistols, and its Kiheitai consequently fought 
the Shogunate to a standstill in the ensuing campaign. In like fashion, Satsuma too adopted British 
drill over Dutch, in no small part because British manuals were made increasingly accessible.86 
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However, Britain was not the only source of military assistance available to the Shogun. 
Unwilling to concede the political conditions required for concerted British aid, the Bakufu instead 
turned to Britain’s main rivals, the French. To a certain extent, France represented something of 
“goldilocks” patron; France had sufficient political and military power in Asia to be useful, but 
appeared less territorially threatening or overtly mercantilist than either the Russians or the British.87 
Importantly, as one contemporary observed, Roches and Parkes ‘hated one another and were as 
jealous as a couple of women’, mirroring wider tensions in Anglo-French policy.88 Another member of 
the British legation remarked that ‘it was amusing to see the French and English Ministers trying to 
outmanoeuvre each other. Wherever one went, the other also immediately went. When one had an 
interview with a Japanese official, so had the other’.89 In 1865, the Shogun requested French 
assistance to establish shipyards and arsenals, and sought a military training mission the following 
year. Work began on a dockyard and arsenal at Yokosuka, under the direction of French naval engineer 
François Verny, while Roches established the Société Française d’Exportation et d’Importation as a 
vehicle for French arms exports.90 The military mission arrived in 1867, under the command of Captain 
Chanoine. It proceeded to train a cadre of Bakufu officers and NCOs, before instructing entire units of 
Shogunal infantry, artillery, and cavalry.91 British regulations were replaced with French, precipitating 
a wider reorganisation of Bakufu forces on French lines.92 By January 1868, the French had trained a 
force of 1,500 infantry, two cavalry squadrons, 5 batteries of mountain artillery and a company of 
engineers, equipped with 1,866 of the latest breach-loading Chassepot rifles.93 
As with the British, however, French support was neither altruistic nor without caveat. France 
had initially sought to maintain concerted pressure on the Shogun alongside the other treaty powers, 
and Roches’ predecessor had advised Paris against military assistance in 1862, arguing that ‘the 
Japanese seek arms and when they see themselves sufficiently provided, they will doubtless seek 
enemies’.94 France likewise imposed its own indemnities on the Bakufu for the murder of a member 
of its garrison at Yokohama, while Roches had himself supported the Shimonoseki campaign, telling  
the Shogun that if the Emperor ‘continues to insist upon the cancellation of the treaties, he is asking 
for war’.95 By extension, France viewed military assistance as a prime opportunity to further its 
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interests in Japan. French-built dockyards were seen as a potential regional base for the French navy, 
while Roches convinced Paris that assistance would provide an outlet for French arms that would 
otherwise go to a rival power.96 Indeed, Shogunal entreaties for ‘arms, munitions, ships and the men 
which are indispensable in order to carry out the submission of the rebels’ were seen by Roches as an 
opportunity ‘to persuade the Taikun that we shall be his friends and natural allies’ and thereby ensure 
‘that his own interest is linked to ours’.97 Even so, Paris still refused to entertain any waiver of the 
Shimonoseki indemnity, on the basis that military assistance alone was sufficient for suppression of 
domain threats to the treaties, and even scaled down the proposed size of the French military mission 
so as ‘not to give at first too great an importance to the mission which will be formed’.98 
Importantly, the provision of French military assistance aggravated Anglo-French rivalries, 
allowing the Bakufu to manipulate this pre-existing principal-principal conflict to its own ends. At face 
value, conditional French assistance appeared to facilitate French influence. The Bakufu told Roches 
that ‘France will be for us the Older Brother who guides and assists his Younger Brother’, and 
dispatched the Shogun’s own younger brother to France for education in 1867.99 Roches became 
directly involved in discussions on governmental reform, while the Quay d’Orsay declared that he had 
obtained ‘so legitimate an influence’ that ‘when the Japanese ministers have wished to have a plan 
adopted by their sovereign they have asked him to support it’.100 Yet, to secure his position, Roches 
recommended that the British provide naval instructors alongside the French military mission.101 
French military assistance had unnerved Parkes, who complained to London that that Roches ‘does 
not care to support very warmly the commercial policy of England’ but instead ‘prefers to minister to 
the military aspirations or vanities of the Japanese’ in the hope of becoming the Shogun’s ‘Military 
Mentor’.102 Consequently, Parkes made it his mission ‘to divert their attention from military glitter to 
industrial enterprise’, and was instrumental in the collapse of a French scheme to finance the Bakufu’s 
military reforms.103 He even described the Yokosuka dockyard as ‘our Suez Canal question’, and was 
particularly concerned at any prospect of Shogunal support for French colonial expansion in Asia.104 
Despite earlier British parsimony, Parkes now performed a complete volte face, writing that ‘England 
should have her fair share in such matters’ and arguing that a naval mission offered ‘as fair an 
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opportunity of exercising a legitimate influence on their action as the French with their military 
schemes’. He even informed London that ‘I have had a little trouble to manage this point, for I thought 
I saw a disposition on the part of our French friends to monopolize arrangements that might minister 
to their influence’.105 
Here, the Shogun’s approach to military assistance mirrored longstanding efforts manipulate 
principal-principal rivalries in order to bypass unpalatable treaty conditions. Moreover, as Roches’ 
perceived influence with the Bakufu grew, so he became increasingly concerned with undermining 
British leverage – even at the expense of French policy. Despite Paris’ desire for increased trade with 
the Shogun, Roches wrote of the need ‘to avoid everything on our part which could cause unpopularity 
for his government’.106 He then deliberately undermined British attempts to use the Shimonoseki 
indemnity to force open new ports, pretending to be ill during the talks.107 Roches later declined 
overtures from Chōshū and Satsuma, demanding that they first subordinate themselves to the 
Shogun, in spite of Paris’ concerns that Roches was placing all France’s eggs in one basket.108 Indeed, 
Roches’ dispatches home have been subsequently described as ‘not only uninformative...but also 
misleading’.109 For their part, the British described their naval mission ‘as a counterpoise to the 
French’, and evidently felt that the Shogun shared these sentiments.110 Parkes relayed repeated 
Bakufu entreaties for the swift arrival of the British mission, and likewise observed Shogunal unease 
at the prospect of a French invasion of Korea, ‘chiefly occasioned by the apprehensions that appear 
to have crossed their minds as to the uses to which their new docks may be put’.111 Yet, such concerns 
did not prevent the Bakufu from appealing for further French naval assistance just two months later, 
ostensibly on the grounds that Britain might create a Hong Kong in Japan, to gain agreement for 
Bakufu naval cadets to gain experience on French warships.112 
While the Bakufu’s adroit exploitation of Anglo-French rivalries undoubtedly reduced the 
political strings attached to foreign military assistance, the quality of military diffusion this balancing 
produced did not provide the desired domestic security. Chanoine, for example, remained sceptical 
of Bakufu military readiness, dismissing Roches’ inflated perceptions of Shogunal strength. In late 
1867, the Shogun resigned his office in a desperate bid to stave off civil war, though he refused to 
surrender the Tokugawa chieftaincy. This came as a complete surprise to Roches, highlighting his 
 
105 Ibid., pp. 13-14; p. 73. 
106 Lehmann, ‘Léon Roches’, p. 289. 
107 Sims, French Policy, pp. 49-50. 
108 Lehmann, ‘Léon Roches’, pp. 294-300. 
109 Sims, French Policy, p. 66. 
110 Satow, Diplomat in Japan, p. 231. 
111 Morton (ed.), Private Correspondence, p. 62, p. 71. 
112 Lehmann, ‘Léon Roches’, p. 299. 
20 
 
limited real sway.113 In the ensuing Boshin War, a Satsuma-Chōshū led coalition systematically 
outfought the Bakufu’s largely unmodernised levies, proclaiming the restoration of power to the 
Emperor Meiji. Pro-Tokugawa clans in the north continued to resist until the end of 1868, while the 
Bakufu navy established the Ezo Republic on the northern island of Hokkaidō, until finally overcome 
in the spring of 1869.114 Roches joined the other Western powers in a pact of neutrality, largely in the 
belief that this would curtail British aid to the imperial faction. Unfortunately, it also curtailed Western 
aid to the Shogun, and Roches was recalled to France.115 As the  French Admiral Ohier remarked, ‘our 
situation in Japan has become difficult as a result of a revolution which had been forecast for a long 
time by everyone, but which our Minister refused to believe in’.116 
Admittedly, the extent to which parallel British support to Satsuma and Chōshū deliberately 
facilitated the Shogun’s defeat has been the subject of some controversy. Daniels, for example, has 
argued that ‘the first objective of Foreign Office policy was to prevent civil war’, blaming Satow’s later 
memoirs for misrepresenting British policy.117 Satow afterwards claimed that Parkes had contributed 
to the ‘downfall’ of the Shogun ‘as far as lay in his power’, and his own sympathies certainly lay with 
the imperial faction.118 Nonetheless, contemporary letters from other British legation staff echo 
Satow’s observations. Willis, the legation doctor, described Parkes as ‘eminently aggressive’ and ‘a 
well placed man…to dissolve the established order of things’.119 Moreover, in Daniels’ analysis, 
Glover’s arms shipments to Satsuma cannot be taken as evidence of British duplicity, given the 
secretive nature of the anti-Bakufu pact between Satsuma and Chōshū.120 Yet, Satow appears to have 
been aware of Satsuma’s involvement with the imperial faction, and Satsuma agents even met the 
Foreign Secretary in London to push their cause.121 Willis himself noted that Satsuma was ‘deeply in 
debt to the House of Glover & Co’, providing ‘a great lever’ for Parkes to exploit in building relations 
with Satsuma.122 Parkes certainly appears to have reconciled himself to the prospect of civil war, 
describing it as a potentially ‘powerful purifying agent’, and he later provided Glover with an 
introduction to the Foreign Office Permanent Secretary, describing him as one who had ‘done a great 
deal to reconcile the Daimios of the West to foreigners’.123 Although Satow’s claim that Parkes ‘had 
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felt the pulse of the Japanese people more carefully...than our rivals’ probably benefitted from more 
than a little hindsight, the British undoubtedly hedged their bets by backing both sides – and 
condemned the Shogun in so doing.124 
Importantly, French assistance gained far more traction in the absence of British competition, 
highlighting the negative effects of principal-principal rivalry on both French conditionality and 
recipient military change. During the civil war, for example, members of the French military mission 
absconded to Ezo with the tacit blessing of the French Army.125 These officers successfully used 
conditionality to exert significant control over Ezo’s military and political preparations. The leading 
French officer, Charles Brunet, demanded that the Tokugawa officers:  
Promise to obey me blindly…in order to triumph, all your efforts must go into 
assimilating French ideas, even though at first you must do this without understanding 
…choose between my return to France or your consent to what I demand.126 
Without any other foreign power to turn to, the Ezo leadership appears to have agreed. Visiting French 
officers remarked in wonder at how ‘everything passes through his [Brunet’s] hands. The simple 
Japanese are puppets whom he manipulates with great skill’.127 Ultimately, this was not enough to 
prevent defeat at the hands of a larger and better equipped Meiji force, but Brunet’s leverage with 
Ezo was enough for Paris to consider further French assistance to the Tokugawa. A French ministerial 
note of 1869 contemplated taking ‘indirect possession of the island of Hokkaido, perhaps even of a 
larger part of Japanese territory’ via support to Brunet, potentially enabling ‘our officers, transformed 
into daimyos themselves’ to ‘become the arbitrators and even the masters of the empire’. Ultimately, 
though, the scheme was rejected, not because the prospect of such control of the Bakufu was far-
fetched, but because ‘one could, of course, expect some strong reactions from the Powers, especially 
England’.128 This same principal-principal conflict had enabled the Shogun to bypass unpalatable 
conditionality attached to French and British military assistance, but in so doing, subordinated the 
quality of military diffusion to political independence. Consequently, when tested against the parallel 
diffusion of its domestic rivals, aided and abetted by a British principal ambivalent about its selection 
of local agent, the Shogun’s efforts at modernisation proved too little too late. 
Meiji Military Diffusion, 1868-94 
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In many respects, the new Meiji regime was confronted with a very similar politico-military dilemma 
as its Bakufu predecessor. It inherited the Bakufu’s international treaty obligations, while facing similar 
challenges to its domestic authority. Moreover, the national desire to check foreign influence and 
regain Japanese sovereignty remained much the same, fuelled by significant popular sonno joi 
expectations. Importantly, though, the new government placed far greater emphasis on treaty 
revision over limiting physical access. As one official remarked, ‘We must defend our imperial 
country’s independence by revising the trade treaties...foreign countries’ troops have landed in our 
ports, and when resident foreigners break our law, they are punished by their countries’ officials. It 
can be said that this is our country’s greatest shame’.129 Yet,  the Restoration proved no less vulnerable 
to Western power than the Bakufu, at least at first. In early 1868, imperial troops from Bizen fired on 
Western representatives at Kobe, while troops from Tosa killed a party of French sailors at Sakai soon 
after. In response, the treaty powers collectively seized four Japanese steamers as a ‘material 
guarantee’, highlighting the ease with which Western neutrality might have shifted against the 
imperial cause during the still-ongoing civil war.130 To prevent a rift with the treaty powers, the Meiji 
regime elected to contain both incidents quickly, making immediate arrests and executions in marked 
contrast to the Shogun’s previous foot-dragging.131 Moreover, the Meiji leaders declared their 
intention to ‘open the country and cooperate with other powers’, and obtained imperial ratification 
of the Ansei Treaties as a demonstration of good faith.132 Even so, Japan was still obliged to sign further 
treaties with Spain, Sweden-Norway, the North German Federation (Prussia’s successor) and Austria-
Hungary in 1868-9; the latter winning fresh concessions that accrued to all the treaty powers. 
Consequently, the necessity of further military diffusion formed a central pillar in efforts to build a 
strong, centralised Japanese nation-state on Western lines, and thereby buttress the Meiji regime’s 
domestic and international position.133 
Initially, however, the Meiji government sought to disentangle itself from foreign military 
assistance, preferring instead to pursue emulation as the Bakufu once had. This was in part a cost-
cutting measure, though Meiji leaders equally distrusted foreign missions who had until recently been 
advising their Bakufu enemies.134 In an effort to maintain France’s leverage with the new government, 
Roches replacement Maxime Outrey adopted a dual tack. He sought to build bridges with the Meiji 
regime, disavowing Brunet’s activities in Ezo, and even waived some of the Sakai executions.135 
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Simultaneously, he applied coercive conditionality in military aid to assert French interests. Outrey 
used the Shogun’s debts as a pretext to maintain control of the Yokosuka arsenal, while similarly 
threatening ‘pains and penalties in the shape of compensation for non-fulfillment of a contract’ should 
the French military mission be dismissed.136 Unfortunately for Outrey, the Meiji oligarchs also 
continued with the Bakufu’s policy of exploiting divergent French and British interests to play one 
military partner off against the other. A British loan promptly settled the Shogun’s debts, securing 
Japanese ownership of Yokosuka, though Verny remained superintendent. Parkes informed London 
that a ‘French design I think has been effectually checked both in regard to these Docks (or Arsenal) 
which might easily have become French territory, and military influence’. The British even agreed to 
withdraw their own naval mission in order to pressure French withdrawal. In justifying this to 
Whitehall, Parkes explained that the new Meiji government ‘cordially desired to be relieved of the 
French’ but ‘felt their difficulty in dismissing one [mission] and retaining the other’. In truth, the Bakufu 
wanted to be rid of both missions, but for Parkes, the important point was that ‘the removal of our 
men carried with it that of the French’ which meant that ‘a cherished project on the part of the latter 
has been destroyed’.137 
 Instead, the Meiji government attempted to emulate Western national armies, as part of 
wider efforts to dismantle Japan’s feudal system. In 1869, a new Ministry of Military Affairs was 
established, and all domain forces were directed to adopt a standardised British naval and French 
military model the following year. The previous proliferation of Dutch, French and British systems 
presented real problems for centralised control. As Satow explained, ‘Japan could not be strong as 
long as it was open to every daimio to withdraw his assistance at his own pleasure, and each prince to 
drill his troops after a different fashion’.138 However, many domains ignored the new injunction, while 
Kishū even began to reform along Prussian lines.139 Moreover, the Meiji oligarchy was itself divided 
on how best to raise a national force, with Chōshū favouring a conscript army while Satsuma preferred 
a professionalised samurai force. Indeed, the prospect of conscription led to the Army Minister’s 
assassination, while an initial quota-based attempt in 1870-1 produced mediocre results.140 In 
Jaundrill’s words, ‘the lack of standardization revealed the relative weakness of the new government 
vis-à-vis the domains’, compelling the new government to create a standing Imperial Guard from their 
own loyal domain troops in 1871. Shortly after, the hereditary domains were dissolved and converted 
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into national prefectures, with their forces either disbanded or subsumed into imperial garrisons. The 
near bankruptcy of many clans precluded serious resistance, but enduring indiscipline in the new 
regional garrisons raised serious questions about the reliability of former domain troops, reinforcing 
the necessity of renewed military assistance.141 
 The inherent difficulty of constructing a modern national army from diverse Japanese fiefs 
obliged the Meiji leadership to seek renewed Western military assistance. In 1870, the Meiji 
government approached Outrey for a new French military mission, and fresh instructors were finally 
appointed in 1872. Inevitably, the intervening onset of the Franco-Prussian War delayed the French 
response, but the hiatus equally reflected renewed French efforts to use military assistance as a tool 
of leverage in wider Franco-Japanese relations. At the time, Outrey was threatening naval action in 
response to Meiji persecution of Japan’s indigenous Catholic population, and sought to make military 
assistance conditional on religious toleration. Outrey eventually relented, suggesting that the 
potential strategic benefits of military co-operation were ultimately more important to France than 
Catholic emancipation. Nonetheless, his decision to view religious toleration as an expected outcome 
(rather than a necessary pre-condition) for military assistance was also the result of enduring principal-
principal rivalries, with protestant British and Prussian propaganda casting aspersions on Catholic 
proselytization gradually undermining Outrey’s stance.142 Indeed, the importation of an alternate 
Prussian military model was certainly favoured by some Meiji officers at the time, though the Shogun’s 
previous investments in French instruction ultimately won out – along with a desire to be seen as 
reliable in international engagements – resulting in the confirmation of French assistance despite their 
recent defeat to Prussia. Importantly, Outrey himself believed that the French had been reappointed 
largely to counter the British, who commanded over half of Japan’s international trade, and were 
likewise requested to provide new naval instructors in 1872.143 With hindsight, its seems more likely 
that the British were intended to balance the French. Of the 66 foreign advisors to the Navy Ministry 
in 1874, 29 were British and 36 French; the latter concentrated at Yokosuka. Certainly, British 
instruction was not especially popular; cadets at the naval academy even claimed to be ‘more than 
happy to see their parents fall ill’ just to get leave.144 
Much as before,  renewed instruction was seen by France as a means to secure its interests in 
Japan, while also conferring a decent helping of much-needed military prestige.145 Indeed, assisting 
with the creation of Japan’s first truly national army afforded the French mission a central role in the 
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Meiji government’s wider nation-building agenda. Conscription, in particular, was an important step 
in the dismantling of Japan’s feudal system, accompanied by the successive revocation of samurai 
class distinctions and privileges. Here, the 1873 conscription law was heavily influenced by French 
practice, down to the inclusion of numerous French exemptions (adjusted to Japanese society) and 
even the ill-advised Meiji usage of the French slang term l’impôt du sang, or “blood tax”, to describe 
Japan’s new citizenship obligations.146 French officers likewise assisted with the new army’s 
organisation and doctrine, establishing specialist schools for training NCOs, military skills, and 
technical branches, alongside a new officer academy modelled on St Cyr. Indeed, the mission’s 
duration was repeatedly extended, and its scope similarly expanded to include the Imperial Guard, 
rising from and initial strength of 16 instructors to a high of 45.147 Simultaneously, though, Parkes also 
viewed British naval instruction as a means to block rival powers’ inroads. In 1870, he pushed the 
Royal Navy to accept Japanese naval cadets onto British warships, after Japan accepted places at the 
US Naval Academy. He likewise supported  the renewal of a British naval mission, informing Whitehall 
that ‘if we were to show any hesitation in furnishing them with Naval officers they would doubtless 
be able to obtain these without difficulty from other Powers’, having ‘already obtained from the 
French Government a numerous corps of Military officers’.148 
Importantly, this balancing allowed the Meiji government to insist on contracting new 
instructors individually, rather than receive official delegations as the Bakufu had done, enabling Japan 
to place greater formal limits on the influence of its foreign advisers. The French accepted contracting 
provided the Japanese paid handsomely and contracts remained subordinate to wider French 
interests in Japan. Military instructors, for example, still had to be approved by the French War 
Ministry, and stayed under French command and jurisdiction.149 Indeed, both Britain and France 
expected further Japanese political concessions as their contracted missions became established, and 
looked to renegotiate the Ansei Treaties early as a result. France even demanded the complete 
opening of the Japanese interior in return for tariff reform, which Japan could not accept.150 Together, 
however, contracting and balancing increased the precarity of military advisors, providing a greater 
degree of Meiji control over the hiring and firing of foreign officers, and concomitantly limiting the 
political leverage assistance generated. In 1874, for instance, the Meiji government dispatched an ill-
advised expedition to Taiwan to placate domestic hard-liners. The French Minister recommended the 
military mission be withdrawn in the event that the conflict spill-over into war with China, in order to 
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bring Japan to heel. Yet Paris baulked at such a risk, and the mission was actually extended as a result 
of the debacle. Similarly, the lack of French command authority allowed Japanese officers to obstruct 
unpalatable French training and gerrymander new promotional processes, despite their ostensibly 
privileged position.151 In 1875, the head of the British naval mission returned home before his contract 
expired, after a comparable spat over the extent of his authority. Moreover, 23 British naval 
instructors were summarily dismissed in 1879 after Britain spearheaded efforts to block tariff reform, 
while French contracts were allowed to expire shortly after.152 
Instead, Japan looked to a new principal, Germany, to complete its military modernisation. 
From 1884, Germany provided instructors for the Japan’s new staff college, precipitating a wider 
restructure of the army overseen by the Prussian Major Meckel. Japan adopted Prussia’s field service 
regulations and divisional structure, and conscription was also revised to create a Prussian reserve 
system in 1889, removing French-style exemptions.153 This shift has traditionally been explained 
through a mixture of functional and normative imperatives. In 1877, Government victory over 
reactionary samurai in the Satsuma Rebellion required eight months and the entire Meiji army of 
32,000 troops, plus a further 10,000 reserves, revealing inadequacies in the army’s higher command 
and control later attributed to French instruction.154 By then, the French army had itself adopted a 
Prussian-style staff system, while Imperial Germany may also have seemed a more appropriate model 
than republican France to Meiji oligarchs concerned by domestic interest in democratization.155 Yet, 
equally, this shift from French to Prussian assistance also reflected Japan’s established policy of playing 
rival Western principals off against each other to get what it wanted. While the Satsuma Rebellion 
undoubtedly affected Japanese perceptions of the French military mission, French contracts were still 
renewed afterwards, while Prussian assistance was not sought until a full seven years later. Moreover, 
French officers were already beginning to reform Japan’s staff processes when they left in 1879, and 
France was again requested to provide fresh instructors in 1880, but refused to accept the pay Japan 
offered.156 Moreover, if German assistance was primarily sought for functional reasons, it is 
unfortunate that Meckel’s preferred views on tactics and doctrine differed significantly from 
mainstream Prussian military thinking, and were in many respects quite reactionary.157 Importantly, 
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while further Meiji attempts at treaty renegotiation stalled in 1882 due to Anglo-French obstinacy, 
Germany was seen as increasingly sympathetic.158 
The importance of principal-agent politics in explaining this shift is reinforced by the fact that 
some French reforms were retained, and new French instructors were engaged alongside the 
Prussians. This ensured neither party gained a free hand, melding both military traditions in the 
process. These latest French officers instructed at the military academy and specialist schools, and so 
did not benefit from the same level of access or prestige as Meckel’s staff mission. However, the 
simultaneous employment of both German and French advisors stimulated significant rivalry, actively 
exploited by Japanese officers. The senior French officer was promoted to prevent Meckel out-ranking 
him, and promptly used his platform at the officer academy to compete with Meckel, delivering rival 
staff lectures with the active encouragement of senior Meiji commanders. For their part, the Germans 
vociferously objected to the French presence, and structural reforms in 1887 conveniently reduced 
the status of Japanese initial officer training – where the French were based.159 Nonetheless, Meckel 
himself was sent home on suspicion of spying in 1888, to be replaced by another Prussian officer. 
France withdrew their officers soon after, in a desperate bid to pressure Japan into renewing their 
own chief instructor’s contract, but to little avail.160 Even the British were not immune to such rivalries. 
Although unconcerned by Prussian military involvement, Britain repeatedly offered additional naval 
aid in an effort to maintain its standing with the Japanese navy. In 1884, the British agreed to educate 
Prince Yamashina Sadamaro at Dartmouth Royal Naval College to prevent him joining the German 
navy, and subsequently attempted to prevent Japan from buying French warships over British, 
claiming that naval effectiveness required the adopted system to ‘be uniform and continuous’.161 
While this approach mirrored previous Bakufu policies, the Meiji government’s centralisation 
of domestic power significantly improved its efficacy, precluding Western sponsorship of alternate 
domain agents. Admittedly, each power instead cultivated coteries of sympathetic Meiji officers as a 
vehicle for their own national interests, exacerbating inter- and intra-service politics.162 Nonetheless, 
as one foreign advisor observed, Westerners remained ‘simply helpers and servants, not 
commissioned officers, and have no actual authority’, while another concluded that ‘the Japanese had 
made up their minds to make what use they could of their foreign servants, but in no case to have 
them become masters, or to invest them with any power’. Indeed, foreign advisors were colloquially 
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known as yatoi in Japanese, or “hired menial”.163 Occasionally, competition between the powers did 
impede Meiji goals. Foreign garrisons remained at Yokohama long after the direct threat to Western 
citizens had passed, in part because the British refused to withdraw unilaterally while French felt their 
presence counteracted British ‘ideas of absolute predominance’.164 Yet, the exploitation of these 
rivalries remained central to Meiji strategies for preserving its agency. One French diplomat decried 
the ‘lack of entente’ among his Western colleagues: 
Most of them appear to have no other object in view than to obtain for their own 
nationals well-paid positions. This results in a real rivalry, and in order to have their 
candidate succeed, they sometimes allow themselves to be party to compromising 
accommodations.165 
By 1880, the French Minister complained that ‘Japan has been able to throw enough dust in our eyes 
to make us believe...it was going to be our champion’, while his successor eventually concluded that 
the Japanese ‘seek to borrow from us our methods of civilization only in the hope of being able one 
day to make use of them against that civilization and against us’.166 
 It might reasonably be argued that the shape of Meiji military modernisation responded to 
domestic instability more than external threat, reducing the significance of international principal-
agent tensions in the patterns Japanese diffusion. Notably, conscription has been described as a poor 
mechanism for external defence but vital to break samurai power, while the ensuing focus on army-
building over naval development is seen as indicative of domestic rather than international 
priorities.167 However, Meiji domestic consolidation should not be seen as distinct from its 
international relations, and military diffusion featured prominently in Meiji responses to both issues. 
To the extent that conscription mirrored European norms, this must be seen in the light of British 
statements that Japanese sovereignty would be returned only ‘in precise proportion to their 
advancement in enlightenment and civilization’ in Western eyes.168 Equally, while conscription 
undoubtedly provided a vehicle  for nation-building, this was itself a response to Western exploitation 
of Japan’s feudal divisions. Conscription was also expected to free-up financial headroom for 
expensive naval defences, while the extended time it took to train naval officers made army reform a 
more rapid route to deterrence.169 Although Kublin dismissed talk of invasion as a ploy to justify high 
military expenditures required for internal security, Meiji commanders spent significant time 
 
163 Jones, Live Machines, p. 91, p. 84, p. xv. 
164 Sims, French Policy, pp. 94-6. 
165 Ibid., p. 103. 
166 Ibid., p. 108. 
167 Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army, pp. 28-39; Goldman, ‘Western Military Models’, p. 54; Presseisen, Before 
Aggression, pp. 31-2; Westney, ‘The Military’, p. 179. 
168 Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism, p. 194. 
169 Jaundrill, Samurai to Soldier, p. 111; Westney, ‘The Military’, pp. 182-3. 
29 
 
preparing territorial defence plans during the 1880s, with senior officers ‘consumed’ by fears for 
national survival that, in Jaundrill’s view, bordered on ‘paranoia’.170 By then, Meiji interest in the 
trappings of Western “civilization” came a firm second to military diffusion, and the revision of the 
unequal treaties in 1894 ultimately reflected a hard-won symmetry in military power between Japan 
and the West.171 
Conclusion 
During the nineteenth century, successive Japanese governments made extensive use of foreign 
military assistance to modernise militarily. Traditionally, neo-realist approaches have viewed such 
diffusion processes as the product of functional imperatives rooted in external threats. Yet, as 
Goldman has argued, Japan’s choice of foreign military partners did not always reflect objective best 
practice, as with the confirmation of French instruction over Prussian after the Franco-Prussian War. 
Even when it did, as with the selection of the dominant naval power Britain to train the navy, 
functional rationales do not appear to have be the only – or even the defining – motive. Consequently, 
constructivist scholars have concluded that the patterns of Meiji military diffusion better reflect the 
influence of culture and norms on state behaviour. Japan’s relative cultural receptivity to foreign 
military ideas is considered to have enabled rapid martial modernisation, while dysfunctional aspects 
are likewise attributed to the influence of elite networks and uneven acculturation processes on 
Japanese military socialisation.172 Nonetheless, the social, political and cultural costs of military 
modernisation in nineteenth-century Japan appear extraordinarily high. Military diffusion ultimately 
precipitated a series of civil wars, sweeping away a centuries-old system of government and 
established social order. When viewed through the lens of Horowitz’s adoption-capacity model, 
therefore, Japan’s drive to modernise as much reflects the high political stakes associated with success 
or failure, as any intrinsic cultural receptivity to foreign military norms.173 While acculturation 
processes can help to explain the hybridisation of local and international practices, illuminating the 
opportunities for and obstacles to military diffusion, they do not well account for Japan’s deliberate 
exploitation of multiple simultaneous sources of foreign military assistance – or the ensuing fusion of 
those different international models.  
Instead, this article has shown how principal-agent politics can significantly account for the 
selection, timing, and especially the duplication of Japan’s foreign military assistance, flowing from 
recipient reactions to conditionality and interest asymmetry. Successive Japanese regimes pursued 
 
170 Kublin, ‘“Modern” Army’, p. 22; Jaundrill, Samurai to Soldier, pp. 161-2. 
171 Wittner, Culture of Progress, p. 4, pp. 110-2. 
172 Goldman, ‘Western Military Models’, pp. 41-68; Westney, Imitation and Innovation, pp. 18-30. 
173 Horowitz, Diffusion of Military Power. 
30 
 
military diffusion both for their own domestic security, and as the means to limit Western political 
encroachment. For the treaty powers, meanwhile, military assistance was expected to provide the 
leverage needed to secure their respective commercial and strategic interests in Japan. Consequently, 
both Japanese regimes exploited multiple sources of military assistance as a means to neutralise 
foreign influence, playing rival treaty powers off against each other to access better aid with less 
strings attached. Both the Shogun and the fledgling Empire manipulated Anglo-French jealousies to 
extract greater military assistance, undermining the political expectations each power attached to 
their aid. Ultimately, the Bakufu could not prevent the British from simultaneously backing an 
alternate Japanese agent, leading to the fall of the Shogun. However, the Meiji Restoration’s 
centralisation of domestic power removed this possibility, concomitantly improving the efficacy of 
balancing in Meiji military diffusion. After Britain and France cooperated to obstruct treaty revision, 
the Meiji military subsequently pivoted to more sympathetic Prussia, while continuing to employ 
token British and French instructors to maintain competitive pressure. Nonetheless, Japan still 
remained an agent state. Both Japanese regimes were dependent on outside help for diffusion, and 
likewise struggled to reassert sovereignty in treaty talks while their military modernisation remained 
incomplete. Although balancing allowed Japan to subvert political conditionality attached to military 
aid, the resulting medley of foreign military assistance also left its mark in the ensuing patterns of 
diffusion, with the Imperial Japanese Army adopting a admixture of French, Prussian and indigenous 
practices while the navy similarly blended British and French technology and ideas. 
This finding helps to explain why military innovations do not always diffuse with high fidelity 
from state to state, augmenting existing cultural and institutionalist approaches through a broader 
understanding of political responses to coercive pressure. Moreover, it suggests that the mechanisms 
of military diffusion cannot be understood in isolation from their motives, notwithstanding their 
frequently separate treatment in the existing scholarly literature, because the one can directly affect 
the nature of the other. Historic cases of principal-principal conflict during military diffusion, such as 
in nineteenth-century Japan, can also directly help to improve our understanding of the contemporary 
utility of military assistance. The UK, for example, has stated its intent to use ‘defence assets and 
activities short of combat operations to achieve influence’ overseas, identifying Nigerian efforts to 
modernise militarily in the face of various domestic insurgencies as a particular focus for UK “Defence 
Engagement”.174  Yet, while Britain, France and the US have all provided military assistance to Nigeria,  
these states have generally declined to provide lethal arms and equipment, citing concerns over 
Nigerian governance and human rights abuses. Like Japan, however, Nigeria’s ability to overcome 
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principal-agent conditions by replicating a marketplace for military assistance undermines such an 
approach. Indeed, Nigeria has been able to source training, armoured vehicles and combat aircraft 
from the West’s strategic rivals, like Russia and China, prompting the Trump administration to 
relinquish previous caveats on the sale of ground attack aircraft.175 In such as circumstance, the 
prospect of accruing “influence”, as states like the UK intend, becomes inherently precarious; like 
Schrödinger’s proverbial cat, influence can only be certain at the point the principal seeks to exercise 
it, whereupon it may turn out to be dead. For countries with limited resources to offer, like the UK, 
the experience of nineteenth-century Japan suggests that competing in such a marketplace is an 
inherently difficult game. 
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